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Tax Policy and the Virtuous Sovereign:
Dworkinian Equality and Redistributive Taxation
David G. Duff*

I. Introduction
Among the purposes of a tax system, it is generally accepted that one role is
to implement a society’s conception of distributive justice.1 Indeed, if justice is, as
John Rawls famously declared, “the first virtue of social institutions,” 2 it follows that
the specification of tax policies to implement this conception of distributive justice
is both ethically and logically prior to the determination of tax policies that are
designed to fulfill other objectives of a tax system such as financing public goods and
services and the regulation of market failures.3 For this reason, distributive justice
may properly be regarded as the first or sovereign virtue of a society’s tax system –
to which a virtuous sovereign should properly attend.
In practice, however, there are various conceptions of distributive justice,
with different implications for the design of a society’s tax system. Classica l
utilitarianism, for example, which underlies much of the economic analysis that
dominates tax policy analysis, conceptualizes justice as the maximization of
aggregate welfare, and supports tax and spending policies that weigh the utility
gains from redistributive transfers against the utility losses attributable to the
imposition of different taxes.4 Based on these precepts, contemporary welfarist
approaches to tax policy have generally favoured proportionate or declining -rate

Professor and Director Tax LL.M. Program, Peter A. Allard School of Law, University of British
Columbia
1 See, e.g. Liam Murphy and Thomas Nagel, The Myth of Ownership; Taxes and Justice, (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2002) at 3. Although Murphy and Nagel’s book may be the most prominent
articulation of this position in recent years, it can be found in Adolph Wagner’s 1883 “Three Extracts
on Public Finance” and is reflected in tradi tional public finance scholarship which distinguishes
between a government’s allocative and distributive functions. See Adolf Wagner, “Three Extracts on
Public Finance” in Richard A. Musgrave and Alan T. Peacock, Classics in the Theory of Public Finance,
(London: Macmillan & Co. Ltd., 1964) 1-15 at 12-15; and Richard A. M usgrave, Peggy B. Musgrav e,
and Richard M. Bird, Public Finance in Theory and Practice, 1st Cdn. Ed. (Toronto: ON: McGraw-Hill
Ryerson, 1987) at 5-12. See also Reuven Avi-Yonah, “The Three Goals of Taxation” (2006), 60 Tax
Law Rev. 1-28.
2 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971) at 3.
3 If justice is the fi rst virtue of social insti tutions, the ethical priority of distributive justice in the
design of a society’s tax system is tautological. Logical priority turns on the fact that social choices
regarding public goods and services and appropriate regul ation are likely to differ accordi ng to the
distribution of economic resources.
4 See, e. g., James A. Mirrlees, “An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation” (1971), 38
Rev. of Econ. Studies 175-208.
*
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income taxes combined with redistributive transfer payments,5 or the taxation of
personal consumption at progressive rates. 6
In contrast to classical utilitarianism, which he explicitly rejects, 7 Rawls
presents a liberal-egalitarian conception of justice, according to which each person
is accorded “an equal right to the most extensive basic liberty compatible with a
similar liberty for others” (the first principle of justice), 8 and social and economic
inequalities are permitted only to the extent that they work to everyone’s advantag e
(the difference principle) 9 and are attached to positions and offices that are
reasonably accessible to all (the principle of fair equality of opportunity). 10 On this
basis, he recommends progressive gift and inheritance taxes “to gradually and
continually … correct the distribution of wealth and to prevent concentrations of
power detrimental to the fair value of political liberty and fair equality of
opportunity,” 11 and a proportional expenditure tax (a flat-rate tax on personal
consumption) to raise revenues so that “the government … can provide for … public
goods and make the transfer payments necessary to satisfy the difference
principle.”12

See, e.g., Joseph Bankman and Thomas Griffith, “Social Welfare and the Rate Structure: A New Look
at Progressive Taxation” (1987), 75 Calif. L. Rev. 1905-67.
6 See, e.g., Daniel Shaviro, “Replacing the Income Tax with a Progressive Consumption Tax” (2004),
103 Tax Notes 91-113; and Joseph Bankman and David A. Weisbach, “The Superiority of an Ideal
Consumption Tax Over an Ideal Income Tax” (2006), 58 Stan. L. Rev. 1413-1456.
7 Rawls, supra note 2 at 26-27.
8 Ibid. at 60. Rawls defines thes e basic liberties (at p. 61) as “roughly speaking, political liberty, (the
right to vote and to be eligible for public office) together with freedom of speech and assembly;
liberty of conscience and freedom of thought; freedom of the person along with the ri ght to hold
(personal) property; and freedom from arbitrary arres t or seizure as defined by the concept of the
rule of law.”
9 Ibid. at 61. Although the difference principle is more generally understood as requiri ng (as Rawls
subsequently emphasizes at p. 75) that inequalities “improve the expectations of the least
advantaged members of society,” this more limited formulation is implied by the more general
requirement that inequalities must be (as an economist would say) Pareto efficient.
10 Ibid. at 73: “The thought here is that positions are to be not only open in a formal sense, but that all
should have a fai r chance to attain them.” Rawls further expl ains (at p. 73) that this principle does
not disregard abilities and efforts, but rather implies that “thos e who are at the same lev el of talent
and ability, and have the same willingness to use them, should have the same prospects of s uccess
regardless of their ini tial place in the social system, that is, irres pective of the income class into which
they are born.”
11 Ibid. at 277, adding (at p. 277) that “the progressive princi ple might be applied at the beneficiary’s
end” i n order to “encourage the wide dispersal of property which is a necessary condition, it seems, if
the fair value of the equal liberties is to be maintained.”
12 Ibid. at 278. For Rawls, a proportional annual consumption tax along these lines is “preferable to an
income tax … at the l evel of common sens e precepts of justice, since i t imposes a levy according to
how much a person takes out of the common s tore of goods and not according to how much he
contributes (assumi ng here that income is fai rly earned).” In addition, he suggests (at p. 279), “[i]t
may be better … to use progressive rates only when they are necessary to pres erve the justice of the
basic structure with respect to the fi rst principle of justice and fair equality of opportunity, and so to
forestall accumul ations of property likely to undermine the corresponding institutions” – addi ng that
this approach “might help signal an important distinction in questions of policy.”
5
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Classical libertarian theories of justice, on the other hand, criticize utilitarian
and Rawlsian conceptions of distributive justice on the grounds that these
“patterned” or “end-result” approaches violate people’s rights to the ownership of
property that is justly acquired and justly transferred.13 From this perspective,
Robert Nozick maintains, all redistributive taxes and transfers are objectionable,14
except to the extent that they correct for past injustices in the acquisition or transfer
of property.15 As a result, most libertarians would limit taxation to the collection of
revenues necessary to support a minimal state dedicated to the protection of
persons and property,16 and allocate tax burdens according to the benefits that
taxpayers receive.17 In practice, these libertarian theories appear to be compatible
with all major tax bases, including income, consumption and wealth, 18 though most
libertarian approaches to tax policy conclude that whatever tax is adopted should be
levied at a flat or proportional rate. 19
Like Nozick, Ronald Dworkin also rejects patterned or end state conceptions
of distributive justice – which he criticizes as “ethically insensitive” in that they
“deploy standards of just distribution that … do not reflect the distinctions and
assignments of responsibility we make in leading our lives.”20 In opposition to
classical libertarianism, however, Dworkin regards a conception of equality as
central to a theory of distributive justice, insisting that “[n]o government is
legitimate that does not show equal concern for the fate of all those citizens over
whom it claims dominion and from whom it claims allegiance.” 21 Drawing on each of
these principles, Dworkin proposes a theory of distributive justice as “equality of
resources” that aims to provide “a unified account of equality and individual
responsibility that respects both.” 22
Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia, (New York: Basic Books, 1974) at 149-231.
Ibid. at 168, arguing that “redistribution is a serious matter indeed, involving, as it does, the
violation of people’s rights.” See also Richard A. Epstein, “Taxation in a Lockean Worl d” (1986), 4 Soc.
Phil. & Pol’y 49 at 68, emphasizing that “wi thin the Lockean world, the redistribution of income
through the tax system is an unacceptable function of government.”
15 Nozick at 230-31 (discussing the possibility of redistributive transfers in order to rectify pas t
injustices).
16 Nozick at ix, arguing that only “a minimal state, limited to the narrow functions of protection
against force, theft, fraud, enforcement of contracts, and so on, is justified; that any more extensive
state will violate persons’ rights not to be forced to do certain things, and is unjustified.”
17 See, e.g., Eric M ack, “Self-Ownershi p, Taxation, and D emocracy: A Philosophical-Constitutional
Perspective,” in Donald P. Racheter and Richard E. Wagner, Politics, Taxation and the Rule of Law: The
Power to Tax in Constitutional Perspective, (Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2002) 9 at 29, n. 11,
arguing that “no individual [should] be made to contribute out of proportion to the benefits to him of
the protective services.”
18 See the discussion in David G. Duff, “Private Property and Tax Policy in a Libe rtarian World: A
Critical Review” (2005), 18:1 Can. J. Law & Juris. 23-45 at 32-34.
19 See ibid. at 34-36.
20 Ronald Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue: The Theory and Practice of Equality, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 2000) at 323-24.
21 Ibid. at 1.
22 Ibid. at 7. In this respect, Dworkin notes, his approach contradicts the “value pluralism” of Isaiah
Berlin, who “insisted that important political values are in dramatic conflict” and “particularly
emphasized the conflict between liberty and equality.” Ibid. at 5. More a detailed expl anation, see
13
14
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This article explains Dworkin’s theory of equality of resources and its
implications for redistributive taxation, arguing that it provides a persuasive
argument for progressive income and wealth transfer taxes as essential elements of
a just tax system. Part II examines the theory itself in contrast to other prominent
theories of distributive justice, concluding that Dworkin’s approach provides a more
compelling conception of distributive justice than welfare-based theories that do
not take rights and responsibilities seriously, Rawlsian theory which is insufficiently
attentive to individual rights and responsibilities, and classical libertarianism which
fails to take equality seriously. Part III considers the implications of Dworkin’s
theory for redistributive taxation, addressing both the kinds of taxes that a virtuous
sovereign should collect for this purpose and key features in the design of these
taxes. Part IV concludes.
II. Theory
In order to understand Dworkin’s idea of equality of resources, it is perhaps
best to contrast this theory of distributive justice with other prominent theories that
he explicitly rejects. The theory’s emphasis on “resources” as a standard for
measuring equality, for example, represents a marked departure from theories
based on utility or welfare, which Dworkin subjects to detailed criticism. 23 At the
same time, the theory’s reliance on a concept of “ethical individualism” that
evaluates the justice of distributive outcomes based on the distinction between
people’s choices and their circumstances differs significantly from the political
liberalism of John Rawls. 24 Finally, the analytical devices and institutional
arrangements on which Dworkin’s theory relies in order to achieve “equality” in the
distribution of resources are fundamentally opposed to those that underlie
libertarian conceptions of private property. 25
The following sections outline Dworkin’s concept of equality of resources in
contrast to other theories of distributive justice: (1) reviewing Dworkin’s critique of
welfare as a measure of distributive equality, (2) explaining Dworkin’s concept of
resources and the idea of ethical individualism that distinguishes Dworkin’s theory
from that of John Rawls; and (3) contrasting the procedural and institutional devices
on which Dworkin’s theory relies in order to ensure equality in the distribution of
resources from the procedural and institutional arrangements contemplated in
classical libertarianism. In each case, I conclude, Dworkin’s theory offers a more
Arthur Ripstein, “Liberty and Equality” in Arthur Rips tein, ed., Ronald Dworkin, (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2007) 82-108.
23 Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue, supra note 20, chapter 1 (“Equality of Welfare).
24 Ibid. at 5, explaining that “Rawls’ social-contract device is designed to insulate political morality
from ethical assumptions and controversies about the character of a good life” whereas equality of
resources appeals to “more general ethical values” such as “the structure of a good life” and
“principles of personal responsibility.”
25 Ibid., chapter 2 (“Equality of Resources”).
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compelling account of distributive justice than the alternative theories that he
rejects.
A. What’s Wrong with Welfare?
Beginning with welfare, it is useful to begin by recalling Rawls’ objections to
classical utilitarianism – that it does not automatically exclude offensive or
illegitimate preferences, 26 does not necessarily guarantee the protection of rights
and liberties which are contingent on their utility at a particular time and place,27
does not concern itself, except indirectly, with how welfare is distributed,28 and
“does not take seriously the distinction between persons.”29 Extending this critique
of aggregate welfare as a criterion of distributive justice, Dworkin rejects welfare as
a standard for measuring distributional equality, arguing that the concept of
“resources” constitutes a better measure for this purpose.
In order to make this argument, Dworkin begins by acknowledging the initial
appeal of welfare as a criterion for distributive justice – noting that the concept of
welfare was devised “precisely to describe what is fundamental in life rather than
what is merely instrumental” whereas “resources are valuable so far as they
produce welfare.”30 As a result, he observes:
The basic, immediate appeal of equality of welfare … lies in the idea that
welfare is what really matters to people, as distinct from money and goods,
which matter to them only instrumentally, so far as these are useful in
producing welfare. Equality of welfare proposes, that is, to make people equal
in what is fundamentally important to them.31

Notwithstanding this initial appeal, however, Dworkin makes three arguments
against welfare as a suitable metric for equality.

Rawls, A Theory of Justice, supra note 2 at 30-31, noti ng that discriminatory preferences are not
automatically excluded from utilitari an calculation, even if they are generally denied or suppressed
“because they tend to be socially destructive and a greater welfare can be achieved in other ways.”
27 Ibid. at 26, expl aining that “there is no reason in principle why the greater gains of some should not
compens ate for the lesser losses of others ; or more importantly, why the violation of the liberty of a
few might not be made right by the greater good shares by the many. It simply happens that under
most conditions, at leas t in a reasonably advanced stage of civilization, the greatest sum of
advantages is not attained in this way.”
28 Ibid. To the extent that marginal utility diminishes, classical utilitarianism may favour equality in
the distribution of resources, though the welfare gain from any redistribution mus t be weighed
against the welfare losses resul ting from disincentives to production and the cost of redistribution
itself. Importantly, however, equality is not an end in itself, but a (potential) product of utilitarian
calculation.
29 Ibid. at 27, explaining that the utilitarian conception of an “imparti al spectator” who aggregates
utilities across different persons effectively conflates all persons into one.
30 Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue, supra note 20 at 14.
31 Ibid. at 31.
26
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First, he explains, to the extent that the concept of welfare does not exclude
political and impersonal preferences, a concept of distributive justice premised on
equality of welfare implies that individuals should be compensated for all such
preferences that are not realized – even if these preferences are offensive or
unreasonable, such as those attributable to racial prejudice or unrealistic
aspirations about some desired state of the world.32 In contrast, Dworkin argues, in
a society that is committed to distributional equality, the conception of equality that
is adopted would presumably exclude the satisfaction of offensive and unreasonable
political and impersonal preferences – thereby precluding any compensation for
unrealized preferences of this sort. 33 More importantly, he adds, since an
unrestricted conception of welfare cannot account for this result, it is necessary to
rely on some independent theory of distributive justice for this purpose.34
Second, he continues, even if the concept of welfare is limited to purely
personal preferences, equality of welfare would require a society to allocate
relatively more resources to individuals with expensive tastes that are costly to
satisfy and expansive goals that are difficult to realize, than to other individuals with
more modest tastes and limited ambitions – even if these expensive tastes and
expansive goals are deliberately cultivated. 35 These “troubling counterexamples”,
Dworkin argues, “are embarrassing for the theory that equality means equality of
welfare precisely because we believe that equality … condemns rather than
recommends compensating for deliberately cultivated expensive tastes.”36
Ibid. at 21-28.
See, e.g., ibid. at 23, referring to offensive political preferences: “a good society is one that treats the
conception of equality that society endorses, not simply as a preference some people might have, and
therefor as a source of fulfilment others might be denied who should then be compensated in other
ways, but as a matter of justice that should be accepted by ev eryone because it is ri ght. Such a society
will not compensate people for having preferences that its fundamental political institutions declare
it is wrong for them to have.”
34 Ibid. at 25 (characterizing success-based conceptions of equality of welfare that admit “sound”
political preferences as “an empty ideal, useful only when it rubber -stamps a distribution already and
independently shown to be just through some more restricted conception of equality of success or
through some other political ideal altogether”); and 27 (observing that “we … need an independent
theory about when an impersonal preference is reasonable or when i t is reasonable to compensate
for one”).
35 Ibid. at 14-15 (concluding that “most peopl e would resist the conclusion that thos e who hav e
expensive tas tes are, fore that reason, entitled to a larger share than others”) and 31 (explaini ng that
an interpretation of equality of welfare based on each individual’s rel ative success in achi eving life
goals implied distributing much less to those with limited ambi tions and much more to those with
“almost impossible goals”). This objection appears to be based on a similar objection to welfarebased conceptions of distributive jus tice in John Rawls, “Social Unity and Primary Goods,” in Amartya
Sen and Bernard Williams, Utilitarianism and Beyond, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1982) at 168-69.
36 Ibid. at 48 and 55. Although Dworkin’s objection in this passage is limited to compensation for
“deliberately cultivated expensive tas tes”, Dworkin maintains that equality of resources would deny
compens ation for all expensive tastes and ambitions (except “cravings so severe and disabling as to
fall under the category of mental disease”) on the grounds that the pursuit of one’s tastes and
ambitions is ultimately a matter of choice for which i ndividuals should be held responsible, rather
than a consequence of thei r circumstances for which compensation is due. Ibid. at 82-83. For a
32
33
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Finally, and more generally, Dworkin argues that the concept of “welfare” is
itself is so abstract and ambiguous that it is impossible to assess its merits for a
theory of distributive justice until “a particular understanding or conception of
welfare is specified” – at which point the ideal invariably loses “whatever appeal it
might have had.”37
If “welfare” is understood in classical utilitarian fashion as an excess of
pleasure over pain or more broadly as “enjoyment” over “dissatisfaction”, 38 for
example, an obvious objection to the concept is that people differ in the extent to
which they regard pleasure or enjoyment as essential to a good or successful life.39
On the contrary, Dworkin maintains:
most of us … are dedicated to something whose value to us is not exhausted or
captured in the enjoyment its realization will bring, and some are dedicated to
more things in that way, or more strongly dedicated, than others. Even when
we do enjoy what we have or have done, we often enjoy it because we think it
valuable, not vice versa. And we sometimes choose … a life that we believe will
bring less enjoyment because it is in other ways a better life to lead. 40

For this reason, what Dworkin calls “conscious-state” theories of welfare do not
correspond to the standards by which most people govern their own lives, making it
a questionable metric for a conception of equality and a theory of distributive
justice.41
critical response to this conclusion, see G.A. Cohen, “On the Currency of Egalitarian Jus tice” (1989),
99 Ethics 906-944 at 916-934, argui ng that the problem of expensive tastes is less a matter of
individual choice than a cons equence of market supply and demand that render one’s tastes
expensive, so that the problem of involuntary expensive tastes also a matter of “brute back luck” for
which an egalitarian conception of distributive jus tice should provide compensation. See also G.A.
Cohen, “Expensive Taste Rides Again” in Justi ne Burley, ed., Dworkin and His Critics, (Oxford:
Blackwell Publishing Ltd., 2004) 3-39, and Dworki n’s respons e to Cohen, see Ronald Dworki n,
“Ronald Dworkin Replies” in ibid., 339-95 at 339-50. For the purpose of this article, it is not necessary
to address this debate, since the argument agains t welfare as a metric of distributional equality is
effectively made on the basis of deliberately cultivated expensive tastes, on which Cohen and
Dworkin agree.
37 Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue, supra note 20 at 285; and Dworki n, “Ronald Dworkin Replies” supra
note 36 at 340.
38 Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue, supra note 20 at 18, explai ning that these terms encompass “the full
range of desirable and undesirable conscious states or emotions that any version of a conscious -state
conception of equality of welfare might suppose to matter.”
39 Ibid. at 42-43, noting that “peopl e differ in the importance each attaches to enjoyment” and that
“almost no one pursues only enjoyment or will make any l arge sacrifice of anything else he values to
avoid a small amount of pain.” See also Dworkin, “Ronald Dworkin Replies” supra note 36 at 340:
“Very few people think that pleasure is all that matters in an overall worthwhile or s uccessful life,
and even those who think pleasure matters to some important degree disagree about that degree.”
40 Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue, supra note 20 at 43.
41 Ibid. at 44, concluding that a conception of equality based on pleasure or enjoyment is “an
unattractive theory in a society in which many if not most peopl e reject that conception, and some
reject it as alien to their most profound beliefs about the goodness of their own lives.”
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Alternatively, if “welfare” is understood more plausibly as a matter of a
person’s “success in fulfilling his [or her] preferences, goals, and ambitions,” 42 it is
vulnerable to another objection – regardless of whether the concept of “success” is
understood by reference to the preferences, goals and ambitions that people set for
themselves (“relative success”) or by reference to more general judgments that
people make regarding the value of their lives (“overall success”).43 Since reasonable
people necessarily define their preferences, goals and ambitions and assess the
value of their lives “against a background of assumptions about the rough type and
quantity of resources they will have available with which to lead different sorts of
lives,” 44 a theory of distributive justice must first determine the resources to which
people are entitled before it can properly assess either their relative success in
achieving their preferences, goals or ambitions or their overall success in leading a
valuable life.45 For this reason, Dworkin concludes, success theories of welfare are
no better than conscious-state theories of welfare as a standard for measuring
distributional equality and “cannot be used to justify or constitute a theory of fair
distribution.”46
Although critics of Dworkin have sought to reassert welfare as a metric for
distributive justice, 47 these objections fail to articulate a specific meaning of
welfare, 48 and remain vulnerable to Dworkin’s objections that they do not
correspond to the pluralistic standards by which people lead their lives, do not
provide an adequate account of equality as a limitation on the recognition of
individual preferences, and do not adequately recognize the role of individual
responsibility as a criterion for assessing the justice of distributive outcomes. As the
following section explains, principles of equality and individual responsibility are at
the core of Dworkin’s conception of distributive justice, distinguishing his theory
not only from welfare-based approaches but also from Rawls.
Ibid. at 17. See also ibid. at 28, describing this conception of welfare as a “plausible theory of
philosophical psychology,” which “supposes that people are active agents who distinguish between
success or failure in making the choices and decisions open to them personally, on the one hand, and
thei r overall approval or disapproval of the world i n general, on the other, and seek to make their
own lives as v aluabl e as possible according to their own conception of what makes a life better or
worse, while recognizing, perhaps, moral constraints on the pursuit of that goal and competing goals
taken from their impersonal preferences.”
43 Ibid. at 28-42.
44 Ibid. at 28.
45 Ibid. at 29 (identifying a “fatal circle” in any attempt to justify a fair distribution of resources based
on a theory of welfare premised on relative success); and 39 (stating that “a concept of overall
success … must include, in i ts description of equality of overall success, assumptions about what a
fair distribution would be”).
46 Ibid. at 39. Although this statement refers specifically to theori es of welfare premised on overall
success, the same criticism also applies to theories of welfare premised on relative success.
47 See, especially, Richard Arneson, “Welfare Should Be the Currency of Justice” (2000), 30 Can. J. Phil.
497-524, arguing that Dworkin’s critique d oes not apply “if we adopt an objective account of welfare
and properly accommodate concerns about individual responsibility.” Ibid. at 497.
48 See, e.g., ibid. at 501, admitting that “a particular welfare-based theory of jus tice … is beyond the
scope of this essay.”
42
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B. Resources, Ethical Individualism, and Distributive Justice
Having criticized welfare as a standard for measuring distributional equality,
Dworkin introduces the concept of resources as an alternative criterion for this
purpose. Unlike welfare, he explains, which reduces all values and preferences to a
single conception of well-being that may not be universally shared, resources
constitute the means through which people are able to pursue their own ends –
making it a more suitable metric for distributional equality in a liberal society which
generally assumes not only that “people differ, sometimes radically, in their
opinions about what makes their lives go overall better or worse,” but also that
“people should govern their lives according to their own convictions on that
matter.”49
By resources, Dworkin generally means impersonal marketable resources
that individuals may privately own and exchange50 – though this is not always clear
in Dworkin’s work, since he also refers to various “personal qualities” such as
“strength, talent, character, and ambition” as other “categories of resour ce.”51
Although these personal qualities enter into his theory of distributive justice,
however, they do so, as he emphasizes, “in different ways”52 – not as resources that
are themselves the objects of distribution in accordance with equality of resources,
but as factors that may (or may not) affect the meaning of an equal distribution.53 As
a result, Dworkin explains, the problem for his theory of distributive justice is “one
of determining how far the ownership of independent material resources should be
affected” by differences in personal qualities. 54
Dworkin, “Ronald Dworkin Replies” supra note 36 at 340-41.
Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue, supra note 20 at 65, stating that equality of resources is “a matter of
equality in whatever resources are owned privately by individuals .” Although emphasizing (at 65)
that “[p]rivate ownership is not a singl e, unique relationship between a person and a materi al
resource, but an open-textured relationship many aspects of which must be fixed politically,”
Dworkin sets thes e questions aside for the purpose of his argument, assuming (at 65 -66) that “the
general dimensions of ownership are sufficiently well-unders tood that the question of what pattern
of private ownership constitutes an equal division of private resources can be discussed
independently of these complications.”
51 Ibid. at 286, emphasizing a “crucial distinction within the broad category of personal qualiti es …
between a person’s personality, understood in the broad sens e to include his [or her] character,
convictions, preferences, motives, tas tes and ambitions, on the one hand, and his [or her] personal
resources of health, strength, and talent on the other.”
52 Ibid.
53 Ibid. at 80: “Though powers are resources, they should not be considered resources whos e
ownership is to be determined … in accordance with some interpretation of equality of resources.
They are not, that is, resources for the theory of equality in exactly the sense in which ordi nary
material resources are.” In this respect, Dworkin’s theory differs from that of John Rawls, who
regards natural talents as “a common asset” the benefits of which are shared wi th the least well off
by virtue of his difference principl e. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, supra note 2 at 101, and 179,
describing “the distribution of natural abilities as a collective asset” from which
the more fortunate” may benefit “only in ways that hep those who have lost out.”
54 Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue, supra note 20 at 80.
49
50
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For this purpose, Dworkin relies on two principles of what he calls “ethical
individualism”: (1) a principle of “equal importance” that requires any political
community that exercises dominion over and demands allegiance from its citizens
to treat them with equal concern; and (2) a principle of “special responsibility” that
regards individuals as having a particular responsibility for the choices that shape
their lives.55 While the first principle “requires government to adopt laws and
policies that insure that its citizen’s fates are, so far as government can achieve this,
insensitive to who they otherwise are – their economic backgrounds, gender, race,
or particular sets of skills and handicaps,” the second principle “demands that
government work, again so far as it can achieve this, to make their fates sensitive to
the choices that they have made.”56 Together, these principles define a conception of
distributive justice that distinguishes between a person’s circumstances and their
choices, making the justice of distributive outcomes as insensitive as possible to
people’s circumstances and as sensitive as possible to their choices. 57
While the distinction between a person’s circumstances and their choices is
not always easy, Dworkin’s approach relies on ordinary ethical judgments that
normally distinguish between chance and choice in making assignments of
consequential responsibility, 58 and typically regard individuals as responsible for
their own personalities in the sense that they identify with the various convictions,
preferences, tastes and ambitions that comprise their personalities and regard the
decisions that they make as their own choices rather than matters of good or bad
luck. 59 On this basis, Dworkin generally understands a person’s circumstances to
include factors that are completely beyond a person’s control (such as genetic
endowments as well as other fortuitous circumstances that Dworkin labels “brute
luck” 60), and a person’s choices to include attributes and actions to which it is
reasonable to assign individual responsibility (which generally include the various
elements that comprise a person’s personality, 61 as well as deliberate decisions to

Ibid. at 5-6.
Ibid. at 6.
57 Ibid. at 287, expl aining that - “i ndividuals should be relieved of cons equential res ponsibility for
those unfortunate features of their situation that are brute bad luck, but not from those that should
be seen as flowing from their own choices.”
58 Ibid., observing that: “We distinguish, for a thous and reasons, between what part of our fate is open
to assignments of responsibility, because it is the upshot of someone’s choice, and what part is
ineligible for any such assignment because it is the work not of people but of nature or brute luck.”
59 Ibid. at 290. To the extent that this is not the case, Dworki n maintains, these attributes of one’s
personality are best regarded as addictions or obs essions “that we wish we did not have, and
struggle to conquer or dispel.” Ibid. at 293.
60 Ibid. at 73, defining “brute luck” as “a matter of how risks fall out that are not … deliberate
gambles”).
61 Ibid. at 82, explaining that: “The disti nction required by equality of resources is the distinction
between those beliefs and atti tudes that define what a successful life would be like, which the ideal
assigns to the person, and those features of body or mind or personality which provide means or
impediments to that success, which the ideal assigns to the person’s circumstances.”
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assume known risks, which Dworkin calls “option luck” 62). As a result, although
acknowledging that people’s choices are not “causally independent of their culture,
history and circumstance,”63 nor of unchosen “convictions, ambitions, and tastes
that influence their choices,”64 Dworkin concludes that concepts of individual choice
and responsibility are crucial to “a political morality that makes sense in terms of –
and of – each citizen’s internal practices of moral and ethical criticism, including
self-criticism.”65
In this respect, equality of resources differs not only from welfarist
conceptions of distributive justice, but also from the political liberalism of John
Rawls – whose principles of justice are derived from a hypothetical social contract
entered into in an “original position of equality” behind a “veil of ignorance” that
shields the contracting parties not only from knowledge of their “place in society,”
but also of their “natural assets and abilities” and their “conceptions of the good”
and their “special psychological propensities.” 66 From this perspective, Rawls argues,
the attributes and actions that define a person’s choices are regarded as morally
arbitrary,67 so that agreed upon principles of justice define only “the basic structure
of society”68 rather than individual entitlements to distributive shares – which
Rawls conceptualizes not as rights in any foundational sense but instead as
“legitimate expectations” for “those who, with the prospect of improving their
condition, have done what the system announces that it will reward.” 69
In contrast to this approach, Dworkin emphasizes that his theory of
distributive justice does not attempt “to insulate political morality from ethical
assumptions and controversies about the character of a good life,” but seeks its
support in “the more general ethical values to which it appeals”70 including the
distinction between a person’s circumstances and their choices. On this basis, he
explains, equality of resources “defines a relation among citizens that is

Ibid. at 73, defining “option luck” as “a matter of how deliberate and calculated gambles turn out –
whether someone gains or loses through accepting an isolated risk he or she should have anticipated
and might have declined.”
63 Ronald Dworkin, “Sovereign Virtue Revisited” (2002), 113 Ethics 106 at 107.
64 Ibid. See also ibid. at 118, at 118, explaining that, although one may not choos e one’s “basic
convictions, tastes, and preferences” one may “choose to act in one way or another given the[se]
convictions, tastes and preferences.”
65 Ibid. at 107, adding that: “Equality of resources rejects strict metaphysical determinism. But we all
reject determinism, all the time, and it is impossible to imagine how we would live if we did not.”
66 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, supra note 2 at 12.
67 Ibid. at 312, arguing not only that “the initi al endowment of natural assets and the contingencies of
thei r growth and nurture in early life are arbitrary from a moral point of view,” but also that “the
effort that a person is willing to make” is also morally arbitrary since “the effort that a person is
willing to make is influenced by his natural abilities and skills and the alternatives open to him.”
68 Ibid. at 7.
69 Ibid. at 103. See also ibid. at 310-315, distinguishing between “legitimate expectations” to “claims”
that are “defined by publicly recognized rules” and entitlements based on “moral desert”.
70 Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue, supra note 20 at 5.
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individualized for each” – determining “what they are, as individuals, entitled to
have” as “a matter of individual right rather than one of group position.” 71
While one might question the extent to which it is reasonable to attribute any
particular distributive outcome to good or bad fortune rather than individual
responsibility, the Rawlsian view that individual choices and actions have no
normative significance for distributive justice is deeply problematic given the
ethical distinction between chance and choice that is ordinarily made in
assignments of consequential responsibility. For this reason, Dworkin’s theory of
distributive justice constitutes a valuable improvement on Rawls’ difference
principle, which is insufficiently attentive to individual rights and responsibilities.
Although classical libertarians have criticized the difference principle on similar
grounds,72 the following section explains how Dworkin’s emphasis on equality as a
criterion for distributive differentiates his approach from classical libertarianism.
C. Equality of Resources: Original Acquisition and Subsequent Redistribution
While Dworkin’s theory of distributive justice includes a principle of
individual responsibility for the consequences of one’s choices, it also affirms a
conception of equality in the distribution of resources. In order to reconcile these
two values, which are often seen as mutually inconsistent, Dworkin relies on the
idea of “an economic market of some form” as both “an analytical device” and “an
actual political institution.” 73 Although Dworkin notes that the market is often
regarded as “the enemy of equality” and “a necessary condition of individual
liberty,” 74 equality of resources is designed to make the market serve both
objectives by requiring that people enter the market “on equal terms.”75 In this
respect, Dworkin’s approach differs sharply from classical libertarianism.
For classical libertarianism, the justice of any distribution in the ownership
of property depends not on a “patterned” or “end result” principle such as utility or
the difference principle, but instead on the justice of its initial acquisition and the
justice of its subsequent transfer.76 According to John Locke, for example,77 even if
all resources were originally held “in common,”78 individuals could legitimately
appropriate these resources without any express agreement based on a right to selfpreservation and entitlement to the fruits of one’s labour79 – subject to a prohibition
Ibid. at 114-15.
Nozick, supra note 13.
73 Sovereign Virtue, supra note 20 at 66.
74 Ibid.
75 Ibid. at 70.
76 Nozick, supra note 13 at 149-231.
77 John Locke, Second Treatise of Government (1690), ed. by C.B. M acpherson (Cambridge: Hackett
Publishing Company, Inc., 1980) at 18-24 [chap. V]. For a more detailed account, s ee, “Private
Property and Tax Policy in a Libertarian World” supra note 18 at 24-28.
78 Ibid. at 18 [chap. V, para. 25].
79 Ibid. at 19 [chap. V, paras. 26-28].
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against the appropriation of resources that spoil before they are used which is
overcome through the development of money, 80 and a requirement that “enough,
and as good” is “left in common for others” which is effectively satisfied by the
productivity of private property. 81 Similarly, Robert Nozick concludes that
individuals may acquire ownership of originally “unheld things” so long as private
appropriation satisfies a “Lockean proviso” that others are not made worse off –
which is fulfilled by the increased social output and varied employment
opportunities that private property creates.82 In each case, these theories presume
that the property rights so acquired include the right to transfer property through
exchange or bequest.83
In contrast to classical libertarianism, Dworkin’s concept of original
acquisition imagines a division of a society’s resources through an auction or other
market procedure among members of the society who are assumed to enter into
this procedure on equal terms.84 Through this arrangement, each individual would
acquire a bundle of resources based on his or her willingness to pay for these
resources compared to the willingness to pay of other individuals – making this
opportunity cost the measure of the resources that each individual could justly
acquire.85 Although individuals wanting to acquire relatively expensive resources
might regret that these are not less costly, they could not reasonably complain that
they have been treated unfairly because the cost of the resources that they choose to
acquire would reflect their opportunity cost to society as a whole.86 In the end,
Ibid. at 20-21 and 28 [chap. V, paras. 31-32 and 46-47].
Ibid. at 19, 21-22, and 23-24 [chap. V, paras. 27, 33-34, and 37].
82 Nozick, supra note 13 at 175-181.
83 See, e.g., Locke, supra note 77 at 39 [chap. VI, para. 72}, referri ng to “the power men generally have
to bestow their estates on thos e who please them bes t”; and Nozick, supra note 13 at 178, referring to
“a permanent bequeathable property right in a previously unowned thing.”
84 Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue, supra note 20 at 66-71, employing the analogy of shipwrecked
survivors who are washed up on an island with no indigenous population and abundant natural
resources, which they seek to divide equally by allocating an equal number of clamshells to all
survivors who can exchange these clams hells for the available resources. Although Dworki n’s
example assumes that all of the society’s resources are subject to private app ropriation (see ibid. at
67, noting that the survivors “do not yet realize … that it might be wise to keep some resources as
owned in common by any state they might create”), his theory does not exclude the possibility that
some resources might also be held in common. As a result, the theory addresses the only the
distribution of privately-owned resources, not the division of resources between public and private
ownership.
85 Ibid. at 70, concluding that equality of resources requires people to “decide what sorts of lives to
pursue against a background of information about the actual cost their choices impose on other
peopl e and hence on the total stock of resources that may fairly be used by them,” and emphasizing
that “the true measure of the social resourc es devoted to the life of one person is fixed by asking how
important, in fact, that resource is for others.”
86 Ibid. at 69, arguing that “luck plays a certain role in determi ning how satisfied anyone is with the
outcome – against other possibilities he [or she] might envision,” but that no one “could … complain
that the division of the actual resources … was unequal.” In this respect, Dworkin explains: “the
contingent facts of raw material and the distribution of tastes are not grounds on which someone
might challenge a distribution as unequal. They are rather background facts that determine what
equality of resources in these circumstances is.”
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Dworkin concludes, no one would prefer anyone else’s bundle of resources to their
own,87 and an equal division of the society’s resources – “equality of resources” –
would prevail.88
Once a society’s resources have been divided in this manner, of course,
people would continue to transfer and exchange resources and would also produce
more resources – making different decisions about work and leisure, consumption
and savings, gifts and bequests, the development of skills and talents, and the
riskiness of investments; obtaining different rates of return from different market
activities; and accumulating different resources over time from those originally
acquired.89 Although a “starting-gate theory” of equality would permit subsequent
inequalities without any adjustment on the basis that it would be unjust to interfere
with the property rights acquired through original acquisition, Dworkin rejects this
conclusion on the grounds that equality is no less relevant to the justification of
subsequent holdings than it is for the justification of initial holdings, 90 so that any
system of property rights established through an equal division of a society’s
resources should be subject to subsequent adjustment in the name of equality.91
Having outlined a basic conception of equality of resources for the purpose of
original acquisition, therefore, Dworkin must extend the idea to contemplate a
“dynamic economy” with production, savings and investment. 92
In order to do so, Dworkin begins by returning to the concept of ethical
individualism on which his theory of distributive justice ultimately rests – arguing
that a dynamic conception of equality of resources must allow distributive outcomes
to vary with people’s deliberate choices, while simultaneously protecting them as
much as possible against adverse distributional consequences attributable to brute
luck. 93 As a result, he explains, equality of resources is not violated if a person
obtains more or less resources than others by choosing to work more or less or in

Ibid. at 67, expl aining that “once the division is complete” no individual “would prefer someone
else’s bundle of resources to his [or her] own.”
88 Ibid., equati ng the i dea of an equal division of resources wi th the an “envy tes t” requi ring that no
one would prefer someone else’s bundle of resources to their own.
89 Ibid. at 73, noting that the equality of resources achieved through an original division of a society’s
resources holds “only for the moment, because if they are l eft alone, once the auction is completed, to
produce and trade as they wish, then the envy test will shortly fail.”
90 Ibid. at 87-88, argui ng that: “Equality can have no greater force i n justifying initi al equal holdings …
– against the competing view that all property should be availabl e for Lockean acquisition at that
time – than later in justifying redistributions when weal th becomes unequal because peopl e’s
productive talents are different.”
91 Ibid. at 88, emphasizing that if a system of property rights making “any acquisition subject to
schemes of redistribution l ater … is chosen at the outset, then no one can later complain that
redistribution is rules out by … property rights alone.”
92 Ibid. at 71.
93 Ibid. at 89, arguing that “we must, on pain of violating equality, allow the distribution of resources
at any particular moment to be … ambi tion-sensitive” (refl ecting “the cost or benefit to others of the
choices people make”), but not “endowment-sensitive” (reflecting “differences in ability of the sort
that produce income differences in a laissez-faire economy among people with the same ambitions”).
87
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occupations that pay more or less,94 by deliberately taking or not taking risks,95 by
winning or losing intentional gambles,96 or by saving rather than spending.97 Where
people’s chances to obtain resources are not equally distributed, however, because
natural talents differ, 98 inheritances vary, 99 and opportunities to take risks
diverge,100 equality of resources demands that any resulting inequalities be offset.101
Since it is impossible to eliminate all inequalities attributable to brute luck, however,
Dworkin must devise another method to ensure that equality of resources continues
to apply over time.
For this purpose, Dworkin draws on the basic conception of equality of
resources for an equal division of a society’s resources – imagining a market
mechanism that all members of society would have been willing to enter into on
equal terms in order to offset the effects of brute luck on distributive outcomes. In
this respect, Dworkin explains, equality of resources aims to achieve a condition of
equality ex ante rather than ex post 102 – making people “equal, so far as this is
possible, in the resources with which they face uncertainty” 103 as opposed to the
resources they possess “after the uncertainties of risk” have transpired. 104
Ibid. at 85, concluding that: “The choice should be indifferent under equality of resources, so long
as no one envies the total package of work plus consumption” that each person chooses.
95 Ibid. at 74, explaini ng that: “Some people enjoy, while others hate, risks; but this particular
difference in personality is comprehended in a more general difference between the kinds of lives
that different people wish to lead…. We hav e already decided that people should pay the price of the
life that they have decided to lead, measured in what others give up in order that they can do so. That
was the point of the auction as a device to es tablish initi al equality of resources. But the price of a
safe life, measured in this way, is precisely foregoing any chance of the gains whose prospect induces
others to gamble. So we have no reason to object, against the background of our earlier decisions, to a
result in which those who decline to gamble have less than some of those who do not.
96 Ibid. at 74-75, emphasizing that “the effect of redistribution from winners to losers in gambles
would be to deprive both of the lives they prefer.”
97 Ibid. at 479, note 8, arguing that: “Someone’s decision to spend rather than save what he has
earned is precisely the kind of decision whose impact should be determi ned by the market
uncorrected for tax under this analysis.”
98 Ibid. at 91, disti nguishing between “the effects of differential talents” and “the consequences of …
choosing an occupation” in response to one’s sense of what one wants to do with one’s life.
99 Ibid. at 347, observing that “the situation and properties of one’s parents or relatives are as much a
matter of luck … as one’s own physical powers.”
100 Ibid. at 76, noting that “the argument in favor of allowing differences in option luck to affect
income and wealth assumes that ev eryone has in principle the same gambles available to him [or
her].”
101 See, e.g., ibid. at 91, referring to “a scheme of redistribution, so far as we are able, that will
neutralize the effects of differential talents”.
102 Dworkin, “Sovereign Virtue Revisited” supra note 63 at 120-22.
103 Ibid. at 107.
104 Ibid. at 121. See also Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue, supra note 20 at 81, explaining in the context of
mental and physical disabilities that his approach “does not right the balance – nothi ng can – i t seeks
to remedy one aspect of the resulti ng unfairness”; and at 104, noting in the context of individuals
with skills and talents that command low economic returns that his approach “aims to put such
peopl e in the position they would have been in had the risk of their fate been subjectively equally
shared. But it does not make them as well-off in the end as those whose talents are in more demand,
or as those with similar talents lucky enough to find more profi table employment.” Al though
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According to Dworkin, this market mechanism is best represented by a
hypothetical insurance arrangement in which individuals who are presumed not to
know the economic returns that their skills and talents will command (and are
therefore equally-situated in this respect) would purchase insurance against the
risk of low returns,105 and individuals who are presumed not to know what if any
inheritance they might receive would purchase insurance against the risk of “bad
inheritance luck”. 106 Although recognizing that the type and level of insurance that
individuals would acquire in this hypothetical arrangement is somewhat
“speculative”, 107 Dworkin identifies four features that are broadly consistent with
those of actual insurance markets.
First, since the administration of any insurance arrangement is not costless
and the costs of insurance benefits and insurance administration mus t be funded
from premiums that reduce the resources available to those paying these premiums,
it is reasonable to assume that coverage would extend only to relatively substantial
and low probability risks for which the expected welfare losses exceed the we lfare
losses attributable to the payment of relatively small but certain premiums. 108 For
this reason, Dworkin explains, “the lower the income level chosen as the covered
risk, the better the argument becomes that most people given the chance to buy
insurance on equal terms would in fact buy at that level.”109 Although Dworkin does
not specify precisely what this income level might be, he suggests that “[t]he
argument becomes compelling … well above the level of income presently used to

Dworkin’s approach is designed to provide ex post compens ation based on a presumed state of ex
ante equality, equality of resources might also enhance actual equality ex ante, for exampl e through
educational programs designed to minimize the effects of natural talents and class backgrounds on
economic opportunities. Dworkin appears to contemplate this kind of ex ante approach to equality of
resources, sugges ting that “an egalitarian society ought, just in the name of equality, to devote special
resources to training those whose talents, as things fall out, place them lower on the income scal e,”
but does not address this issue in any detail on the basis that this “is part of the l arger question of an
egalitarian theory of education, which I have not even attempted to take up here.” Ibid. at 108.
105 Ibid. at 73-109, explaining (at 94) that the hypothetical insurance arrangement need not assume
that “people are wholly ignorant of what talents they have, but rather, that for some other reason
they do not have any sound basis for predicting … what income the talents they do have can produce,
or even whether the economic situation will be such that these talents will find any employment.” See
also ibid. at 77, suggesti ng that “the idea of a market in ins urance provides a counterfactual guide”
through which equality of resources might address income disparities at tributable to mental and
physical disabilities.
106 Ibid. at 347.
107 Ibid. at 79.
108 Ibid. at 97-98, emphasizing that in “the normal case of insurance, … people i ncur a small certain
loss to prevent an unlikely grate loss whose marginal utility costs are serious enough to justify a
financially disadvantageous trans action.” Although Dworki n’s analysis on this point draws on the
notion of welfare and the principle of diminishing marginal utility, it does so in a very different way
than welfare-based conceptions of distributive jus tice – as an account of the kinds of insurance that
equally-situated individuals would acquire rather than an independent measure of the justice of
distributive outcomes. For a more detailed discussion of the relations hip between i ns urance and
utility in Dworkin’s theory, see Dworkin, “Sovereign Virtue Revisited” supra note 63 at 129-36.
109 Ibid. at 97.
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trigger transfer payments for unemployment or minimum wage levels in either
Britain or the United States.” 110
Second, since individuals are much less likely to insure against losses for
which they are personally responsible than losses for which they are not
responsible (and insurers are reluctant to insure losses for which individuals are
personally responsible given the problem of “moral hazard” whereby the availability
of insurance encourages more and larger claims), the kinds of risks that this
hypothetical insurance arrangement would be expected to cover are those that are
attributable primarily to the brute luck that determines a person’s circumstances
rather than the attributes and actions that define their choices (including the
deliberate assumption of known risks). For this reason, Dworkin suggests, a
dynamic conception of equality of resources would provide health and income
insurance for individuals who experience an illness or disability for which they are
not responsible and against which they could not insure, but not for illnesses and
disabilities that are primarily attributable to their own actions or against which they
could have insured if insurance were available on equal terms. 111 For the same
reason, equality of resources would generally provide insurance for individuals with
skills and talents that command low economic returns,112 though presumably not
where these low returns are clearly attributable to an individual’s deliberate
decision to pursue less remunerative activities. 113 In addition, Dworkin maintains,
equality of resources would not provide insurance against losses resulting from
Ibid. For a more detailed exami nation, see Daniel Markovits, “How Much Redistribution Should
There Be?” (2003), 112 Yale L.J. 2291 at 2305-2313, concluding that “peopl e would insure only up to
talent levels that fall significantly – more than 25% – below the mean.”
111 Ibid. at 73-74, distinguishing between someone who “develops cancer in the course of a normal
life” where “there is no particular decision to which we can point as a gamble risking the disease” and
someone who “smoked cigarettes heavily”; and at 77, arguing that “the bare idea of equality of
resources, apart from any paternalistic additions, would not argue for redistri bution from the person
who had insured to the person who had not if, horribly, they were both blinded i n the same accident.”
Although Dworkin is not clear on the rel ationship between paternalistic concerns and equality of
resources, the reference to “paternalistic additions” in this passage suggests that these
considerations can be integrated with his idea of equality of resources – for example, by imagi ning
what additional insurance an individual might have acquired in a hypothetical position of equality if
cognizant of the distribution of persons who do and do not purchase accident insurance.
112 Ibid. at 92-99.
113 Although Dworki n is not explicit on this point, this conclusion is consistent with his analysis of
personal tastes more generally – which he attributes to a person’s choices rather than their
circumstances, notwi thstanding that the cost to satisfy thes e tas tes is attributable to “the contingent
facts of raw material and the distribution of tastes.” Ibid. at 69 and 83, concluding that it is “unlikely”
that individuals would purchase insurance against the risk of costly preferences “except in the case of
cravings so sev ere and disabling as to fall under the category of mental disease.” See also Dworki n,
“Sovereign Virtue Revisited” supra note 63 at 119, explaini ng that equality of resources “draws an
important distinction between people’s physical, material, and economic circumstances, on the one
hand, and their ambitions and tas tes on the other. People are in principl e entitled to compensation,
measured by a hypothetical insurance calculation, when their resources and opportunities are low in
virtue of some disadvantage or handicap in the former circumstances, but not when they are low
because the choices they have made out of the latter properti es are expensive meas ured by the
opportunity costs to other people of those choices.”
110
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risks and gambles that people voluntarily assume,114 though he also suggests that
“paternalistic reasons” might justify “limiting how much any individual may risk.” 115
In contrast, he argues, equality of resources would provide insurance against the
risk of receiving little or no inheritance, the prospect of which depends more on the
luck of one’s birth than one’s own actions.116
Third, because it is often difficult to distinguish between economic outcomes
for which an individual is primarily responsible and economic outcomes that are
primarily attributable to brute luck, the coverage that a hypothetical insurance
arrangement would provide might be expected to include common features of
standard insurance contracts that are designed to reduce moral hazard – such as coinsurance that limits the amount of benefits paid to a percentage of a claimant’s
losses,117 and a requirement that claimants prove their losses.118 Coverage levels
might also differ based on the extent to which it is possible to differentiate
categories of claims for which the risk of moral hazard varies – with higher coverage
for losses for which individuals are less likely to bear any responsibility and lower
coverage for losses for which individuals are more likely to bear some responsibility.
Finally, and most significantly for the purpose of this article, Dworkin argues
that the premiums under the hypothetical insurance arrangements that he
contemplates would likely be measured as “an increasing percentage of the income
the policy owner turns out to earn” in the case of insurance against the risk of a low
income,119 and “a steeply progressive rate” in the case of inheritances. 120 Since
insurers would be able to offer a higher level of coverage by charging higher
premiums, and individuals would have reason to purchase this insurance if it
increased their expected welfare, the principle of diminishing marginal utility
suggests that equally-situated individuals who are presumed not to know what they
would earn or inherit would prefer to buy insurance with premiums that are an

Ibid. at 74-75, arguing that “the possibility of loss was … the fai r price of the possibility of gain”
and concluding that “the effect of redistribution from wi nners to losers in gambl es would be to
deprive both of lives they prefer.”
115 Ibid. Although Dworkin does not appear to contemplate the possibility, one way to limit the
amount that any i ndividual may risk is to provide some kind of compens ation in the event of loss es –
pres umably on the basis of the s ame paternalistic considerations that mi ght jus tify limits on how
much any individual might risk. As explained earlier, these paternalistic considerations might
reasonably be integrated wi th what Dworkin calls “the bare idea of equality of resources” by
imagining what addi tional insurance individuals might have acquired in a hypothetical insurance
market if cognizant of the risks of various losses. Supra note 111.
116 Ibid. at 346-49.
117 Ibid. at 101. Other common features might include deductibles that limit benefits to losses
exceeding a minimum threshold (as is often the case with employment and disability insurance), and
caps that limit the maximum amount of any benefit.
118 Ibid. at 101-02, adding that proof of a loss would be “easily provided” at lower levels “by failed
attempts to find employment or by evidence of less than average general physical and mental
abilities, and so forth.”
119 Ibid. at 100.
120 Ibid. at 348.
114
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increasing function of their income or inheritances.121 In each case, therefore, the
concept of a hypothetical insurance market constitutes the basis for redistributive
taxes, conceptualized as “premiums” that equally-situated individuals would agree
to pay.
Although one might question the emphasis that equality of resources places
on ex ante equality over ex post outcomes, the extent to which brute luck can be
distinguished from option luck, and the types of insurance that equally-situated
individuals might reasonably be expected to purchase in a hypothetical insurance
market, 122 Dworkin’s ideas of original acquisition and subsequent redistribution
represent compelling alternatives to classical libertarianism, affirming a conception
of equality as essential to a theory of justice not only for the original acquisition of
resources but also for their subsequent distribution. The remainder of this article
considers the implications of Dworkin’s theory for redistributive taxation.
III. Practice
As a legal and political philosopher, not a tax scholar, it is not surprising that
Dworkin’s comments on redistributive taxation are limited and basic – emphasizing
primarily the conceptual rule of these taxes in a society committed to equality of
resources as “premiums” that equally-situated individuals would have been willing
to pay to insure against the risks of illness, disability or low market returns, and the
risk that they might receive little or no inheritance.
The following sections build on Dworkin’s account of redistributive taxation,
considering the implications of his theory for the kinds of taxes that a society should
levy in order to promote equality of resources, as well as the design of these taxes.
The first section considers the form of a personal tax to insure against illness,
disability and low market returns, and the second examines the design of a tax to
insure against little or no inheritance.
A. Personal Taxation
With respect to personal taxation, tax policy analysts generally contemplate
three different kinds of taxes, which apply to different tax bases: (1) income taxation,
which applies to revenue less expenses over a period of time, typically a year, and in
Ibid. at 100-101, referring specifically to insurance against a low income.
See, e.g., Michael Otsuka, “Luck, Insurance and Equality” (2002), 113 Ethics 40-54 at 50, arguing
that Dworkin’s ex ante approach fails to reconcile equality of resources with inequalities that arise ex
post; and Elizabeth Anderson, “How Should Egalitarians Cope with Market Risks?” (2008), 9
Theoretical Inquiries in Law 239-270, arguing that an egalitari an conception of distributive justice
requires constraints on distributive shares that markets may generate. To the extent that Dworki n’s
concept of a hypothetical insurance market can incorporate paternalistic considerations and provide
insurance against the risk of inhabiti ng a society characterized by extreme inequalities, it may be
possible to incorporate these concerns within an expanded conception of equality of resources.
121
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principle includes all income from labour and capital123; (2) consumption or
expenditure taxation, which also applies to revenue less expenses over a period of
time, but excludes all income that is saved during this period rather than spent124;
and (3) wealth taxation, which generally applies to the aggregate value of a person’s
assets less liabilities at a particular time such as the end of a taxation year. 125 To
this traditional trio of personal tax bases, tax theorists have also added ability or
endowment taxation, which would in principle apply to a person’s income-earning
ability, irrespective of the amount of income that the person actually earns.126
Beginning with income taxation, proponents generally extol the fairness of
this tax base, which in principle applies comprehensively to all categories of income,
and is often said to provide the most equitable measure of each person’s “ability to
pay” tax.127 Although many arguments for the taxation of personal income are
explicitly welfarist, viewing the concepts of income and ability to pay as substitutes
or surrogates for individual welfare or utility, 128 some rely on non-welfarist
This description emphasizes the source of the income, which generally corres ponds to the concept
of income in source-based income tax regimes like those in Canada and the United Kingdom. In
contrast to this source concept of income, much U.S. tax policy analysis refers to the comprehensive
concept of income propos ed by Henry Simons, which defines income in terms of its uses for
consumption or saving. Henry C. Simons, Personal Income Taxation: Th e Definition of Income as a
Problem of Fiscal Policy, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1938) at 50.
124 This description applies to a cash-flow personal consumption tax in which tax is paid when
income is spent on consumption rather than saved. See, e.g., William D. Andrews, “A Consumption
Type or Cas h Flow Personal Income Tax” (1974), 87 Harv. L. Rev. 1113; and Nicholas Kaldor, An
Expenditure Tax, (London: Routledge, 1955). Alternatively, a yield-exemption consumption tax would
exempt all capital income from tax, making this form of consumption tax equivalent to a so-called
wage tax that would apply exclusively to l abour income. See, e.g. D avid Bradford, Untangling the
Income Tax, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1986) at 89-94. Although these authors
generally assume that the yield-exemption approach is equivalent to the cash-flow approach, this
equivalence holds only if several assumptions apply, including that inves tment returns are certai n,
taxpay ers can borrow and l end unlimited amounts at a risk-free rate, and that tax rates are not
progressive and remain constant over time – assumptions that are unlikely to be s atisfied in practice.
See, e.g., Michael J. Graetz, “Implementing a Progressive Consumption Tax” (1979), 82 Harv. L. Rev.
1575 at 1602.
125 See, e.g., C.T. Sandford, J.R.M. Willis and D.J. Ironside, An Annual Wealth Tax, (London: Hei nemann
Educational Books, 1975); and David Shakow and Reed Shuldiner, “A Comprehensive Wealth Tax”
(2000), 53 Tax L. Rev. 499.
126 See, e.g., Lawrence Zelenak, “Taxi ng Endowment” (2006), 55 Duke L.J. 1145 at 1145, explaining
that the i dea was proposed by the firs t president of the American Economic Association in 1888, who
argued that “a facul ty tax consti tutes the only theoretically just form of taxation, men being required
to serve the state in the degree i n which they have ability to serve themselves.” Francis A. Walker,
“The Bases of Taxation” (1888), 3 Po l. Sci. Q. 1 at 15. Al though it is widely recognized that a tax on
earning ability would be impossible to administer, ability or endowment might nonetheless be
regarded as an ideal to which an actual tax system should aspire in various ways.
127 See, e.g., Alan Gunn, “The Case for an Income Tax” (1979), 46 U. Chi. L. Rev. 370.
128 See, e.g., Richard Goode, “The Economic Definition of Income” in Joseph A. Pechman,
Comprehensive Income Taxation, (Washington, D.C.: The Brooki ngs Institution, 1977) 1 at 9, arguing
that “the income tax is superior in pri nciple to the expenditure tax … because income is generally a
better index of ability to pay than is consumption”; and Robert Murray Hai g, “T he Concept of Income
– Economic and Legal Aspects,” in R.M. Haig, The Federal Income Tax, (New York: Columbia
123

20

conceptions of distributive justice which regard personal income taxation as the
legitimate assertion of a social claim to a share of all output based on “the role of
fortuity in income distribution and the dependence of producers on consumers and
other producers to create value in our society.”129 The latter rationale is obviously
more compatible with equality of resources than the former.
For those favouring personal consumption or expenditure taxation, on the
other hand, tax fairness is best measured by reference to the resources that one
consumes during a taxable period, rather than the income that one earns during any
period (which may be spent on current consumption or saved in order to finance
future consumption) – on the grounds either that individual welfare ultimately
depends on personal consumption rather than income,130 or that judgements about
legitimate distributive shares properly concern the resources that one withdraws
from society through personal consumption rather than the resources to which one
is entitled by virtue of one’s labour and investment. 131 Consumption tax advocates
also challenge the fairness of the income tax, arguing that it discriminates against
persons who choose to save rather than spend 132 – differentiating between
individuals who are equally situated ex ante based solely on their preference for
future consumption over current consumption,133 and imposing a “double tax” on
saving by taxing the returns that compensate savers for deferred consumption.134
On these grounds, proponents argue, a personal consumption or expenditure tax is

University Press, 1921) 27 at 55, defining income as “a flow of satisfactions or intangible
psychological experiences.”
129 Alvin Warren, “Would a Consumption Tax Be Fairer Than an Income Tax?” (1980), 89 Yale L.J.
1081 at 1091, citing Rawls, A Theory of Justice, supra note 2 at 72-74, 100-108 and 310-15. See also
Charles R. O’Kelley, Jr., “Rawls, Justice, and the Income Tax” (1981), 16 Geo. L. Rev. 1. A similar
understanding appears to play a role in Henry Simon’s view of the personal income tax, which he
regards “as a means of mitigati ng economic inequality” and defi nes “largely in the light of
considerations of justice” includi ng the absence of “a ny justification for prevailing inequality in terms
of personal desert.” Simons, supra note 123 at 18 and 41.
130 See, e.g., Irving Fisher, The Nature of Capital and Income, (London: Macmillan, 1906).
131 See, e.g., Edward J. McCaffery, “The Uneasy Case fo r Capital Taxation” in Ellen Frankel Paul, Fred D.
Miller, Jr., and Jeffrey Paul, eds., Taxation, Economic Prosperity, and Distributive Justice, (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2006) 166 at 167 and 168, arguing that “the moment of spending … is
the right time to make social judgments over the appropriate l evel of taxation” and that “our ordi nary
and refl ective moral intuitions ought to consistently run out to the uses of material resources, and not
to thei r sources.” For a much earlier version of this argument, s ee Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (1651),
ed. By C.B. Macpherson (Harmondsworth, UK: Penguin, 1985) at 386-87, argui ng that “the equality of
imposition, consisteth rather in the equality of that which is consumed, than of the riches of the
persons that consume the same.”
132 See, e.g., Edward J. McCaffery, Fair Not Flat: Ho w to Make the Tax System Better and Simpler,
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002) at 35, arguing that: “The very c oncept of an income tax is
biased against saving and in favour of spending.”
133 See, e.g., Bradford, supra note 124 at 315; and Fischer, supra note 130 at 249-53.
134 See, e.g., Andrews, supra note 124 at 1167, arguing that an i ncome tax “imposes an excessive
burden on deferred cons umption”; and McCaffery, Fair Not Flat, supra note 132 at 36, arguing that an
income tax imposes a “second tax on savings.” See also J.S. Mill, Principles of Political Economy, Books
IV and V (1848), (New York: Penguin Classics, 1985), ch. 2 at 162-69.
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both fairer and more efficient than a personal income tax.135 As with the taxation of
personal income, therefore, arguments for personal consumption or expenditure
taxation invoke both welfarist and non-welfarist conceptions of distributive justice.
This is also the case with arguments for personal wealth taxation and ability
or endowment taxation. The former, for example, is defended both on the welfarist
grounds that wealth confers a form of ability to pay that is not recognized in most
measures of income or consumption,136 and on the non-welfarist basis that wealth
taxation can curb extreme concentrations of wealth which can threaten democratic
institutions, social stability and economic growth and prosperity. 137 The latter is
similarly supported on the welfarist basis that earning ability corresponds more
closely to individual welfare than income, consumption or wealth, 138 and the nonwelfarist basis that earning ability is a better measure of unjustified economic
inequality than proxies such as income, consumption or wealth – which reflect the
combined effect of one’s ability or endowment and one’s choices regarding work or
leisure and savings or consumption. 139
With its emphasis on ex ante equality and its reliance on a principle of ethical
individualism that distinguishes a person’s choices from their circumstances, one
might have expected that equality of resources would regard a consumption or
expenditure tax or an ability or endowment tax as the ideal tax base for personal
taxation. Indeed, Dworkin’s conclusion that equality of resources is not violated if a
person obtains more or less resources than others by deliberately taking or not
taking risks, by winning or losing intentional gambles, or by saving rather than
spending,140 would appear to support consumption or expenditure taxation as an
See, e.g., Bankman and Weisbach, supra note 6.
See, e.g., Richard M. Bird, “The Case for Taxi ng Personal Weal th,” in Report of the Proceedings of
the Twenty-Third Tax Conference, (Toronto: Canadian Tax Foundation, 1972) 6 at 8, arguing that
personal wealth affords advantages of “opportunity, flexibility and securi ty” beyond the income that
it may generate; and Shakow and Shuldiner, supra note 125, arguing that “substantial income from
wealth effectively goes untaxed under the current income tax system” which generally does not apply
to gains until they are realized and does not apply to so-called “imputed income” from assets that are
not used to generate a market return.
137 See, e.g., James R. Repetti, “Democracy, Taxes, and Wealth” (2001), 76 N.Y. L. Rev. 825; and Thomas
Picketty, Capital in the Twenty-First Century, (Cambridge, MA: Harv ard University Press, 2014) at
515-34.
138 See, e.g., D an Shaviro, “Endowment and Inequality” in Jos eph J. Thorndike and Dennis J. Ventry Jr.,
Tax Justice: The Ongoing Debate, (Was hington, D.C.: The Urban Institute Press, 2002) 123 at 128 -29,
expl aining that an individual with greater earning ability is better off than a persons with a lower
earning ability even if the former chooses to work less and earn less income. See also Zelenak,
“Taxing Endowment” supra note 126 at 1149-1153, reviewing utilitarian arguments for endowment
taxation
139 see, e.g., Shaviro, ”Endowment and Inequality” supra note 138 at 140, arguing that “endowment as
a tool for measuring inequality … remains closer to bedrock than the proxy standards”; and Zel enak,
“Taxing Endowment” supra note 126 at 1154-55, reviewing the prima facie liberal-egalitari an case
for endowment taxation
140 Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue, supra note 20 at 74-75 and 479, note 8. See supra notes 95-97 and
accompanying text.
135
136

22

ideal tax base, while his insistence that equality of resources allows the distribution
of resources to be “ambition-sensitive” but not “endowment-sensitive” 141 seems to
support ability or endowment taxation as an ideal tax base. Not surprisingly,
therefore, advocates of each of these tax bases have referred to Dworkin for
support.142
In fact, however, Dworkin rejects endowment, consumption and wealth as
ideal tax bases for redistributive taxation and explicitly endorses the income tax for
this purpose.143 Regarding endowment, Dworkin objects that talents and ambitions
are “too closely intertwined” to differentiate for tax purposes,144 and that requiring
people to pay for their talents would require those with high earning abilities to
“purchase leisure time or the right to a less productive occupation at the cost of
other resources” – violating equality of resources by causing those whose skills and
talents command the highest economic returns to envy those whose earnings
abilities are less.145 Consumption and wealth, on the other hand, are rejected on the
grounds that the former would exclude investment returns which are presumed to
reflect more than “preferences for later consumption,”146 while the latter would
impose an additional burden on income that a person chooses to save rather than
spend.147
Although welfarists are generally sympathetic to the idea of ability or
endowment taxation on the grounds that it would eliminate tax disincentives to
work,148 most liberal-egalitarians share Dworkin’s aversion to this tax base on the
grounds that a tax on earning abilities would force those whose skills and talents
command the highest economic returns to engage in these pursuits for a period of
time in order to pay the tax – interfering with their freedom to conduct their lives as
they choose within a framework of equal justice. 149 As others have observed,
Ibid. at 89. See supra note 93.
See, e.g., Edward J. McCaffery, “Tax’s Empire” (1996), 85 Geo rgeto wn L.J. 71 at 141-141-44, relying
on Dworki n’s “political-interpretive approach” to s upport a progressive consumption tax, but not
referring specifically to Dworkin’s work on equality of resources ; and Shaviro, “Endowment and
Inequality” supra note 138 at 140-42, reviewing liberal-egalitari an arguments for redistributing
income from high-endowment to low-endowment individuals.
143 Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue, supra note 20 at 90-91 and 478-79, note 8.
144 Ibid. at 91, obs erving that” “Talents are nurtured and developed, not discovered full-blown, and
peopl e choos e which talents to dev elop in respons e to thei r beliefs about what sort of person it is
best to be.”
145 Ibid. at 90.
146 Ibid. at 479, n. 8, assuming that investment income “reflects skill in investment as well as
preferences for later consumption.”
147 Ibid., argui ng that a person’s decision “to spend rather than save” is “precisely the ki nd of decision
whose impact should be determined by the market uncorrected for tax.”
148 See, e.g., Walker, supra note 126; and Mirrlees, supra note 4.
149 See, e.g., John Rawls, Justice as Fairness, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001) at 158,
rejecti ng an endowment tax on the basis that it would violate our basic liberties”; Eric Rakowski,
“Can Wealth Taxes Be Jus tified?” (2000), 53 Tax L. Rev. 263 at 267, n. 10, arguing that “it seems
wrong to compel somebody to pay taxes on the value of his tal ents – capacities that came to him
naturally or incidental to some voluntary activity and not by his design – if he chooses not to use
141
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however, if liberal-egalitarians consider it acceptable for a tax system to require
people to work longer hours or in particular occupations in order to obtain
sufficient after-tax income in order to satisfy their consumption preferences,150 it is
not clear why it is unacceptable for a tax system to require people to work at least
some hours in some occupations in order to satisfy the requirements of a
redistributive tax.151 While an answer may lie in a distinction between market
returns that are realized though social interaction and potential returns that are not
realized through market exchanges, this argument requires further elaboration.152
Even if ability or endowment taxation is considered normatively indefensible
(and administratively infeasible), however, it might be possible to imagine specific
features of a tax and transfer system that might aim to track Dworkin’s distinction
between a person’s ambitions and their endowments in ways that are both
administratively feasible and normatively acceptable.153 Public health insurance, for
example, arguably redistributes along one dimension of endowment by transferring
resources from the healthy to the sick, 154 as do disability support programs which
transfer resources from the “able” to the “disabled”. The same may also be said of
public pension plans, which redistribute resources from “the short-lived to the longlived.” 155 Others have proposed endowment-related taxes that would vary according
to average parental income during childhood,156 or Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT)

them productively” since this “would effectively enslave the able, by forcing them to put their hi ghly
taxes talents to some lucrative employ, on pain of sitting in a debtors’ prison, however unpalatable
the person found compensated work”; and Murphy and Nagel, supra note 1 at 122, identifying a
“moral objection that endowment taxation would effectively force work on those who could
otherwise s urvive without wage earnings and likewise force many people who would prefer a lowerpaying position into careers that they have no interest in.”
150 In this respect, liberal-egalitari ans differ from classical libertarians, who – as Nozick argued –
regard redistributive income taxes as “on a par with forced labor.” Nozick, supra note 13 at 169.
151 See, e.g., Ki rk J. Stark, “Enslaving the Beachcomber: Some Thoughts on the Liberty Objections to
Endowment Taxation” (2005), 18 Can. J. L. & Juris. 47 at 49, arguing that “there is no difference in
kind or in degree between the interference with liberty occasioned by the two types of taxes” –
“unless one assigns greater moral value to non -market activities than to market activities (a position
arguably in tension wi th the liberal principl e of neutrality as between alternative visions of the good
life”; and Shaviro, “Endowment and Inequality” supra note 138 at 133. As Stark and others emphasize,
howev er, this conclusion may not apply if labour markets are “lumpy” so that a particular level of
income can be obtained only by working full time. Stark, supra note 151 at 59, n. 64; and Shaviro,
“Endowment and Inequality” supra note 138 at 138-39.
152 For an argument along these lines, see David M. Hasen, “Liberalism and Ability Taxation” (2007),
85 Tex. L. Rev. 1057 at 1113, argui ng that legi timate redistributive in a liberal society should extend
only to “resources that would be created in the system of social cooperation”.
153 See, e.g., Zelenak, “Taxi ng Endowment” supra note 126 at 1172-1181, examining various schemes
of “partial endowment taxation”.
154 See, e.g., Kyle Logue and Ronen Avraham, “Redistributing Optimally: Of Tax Rules, Legal Rules, and
Insurance” (2003), 56 Tax L. Rev. 157 at 226-27.
155 Ibid. at 227, n. 211.
156 Bruce Ackerman and Anne Alstott, The Stakeholder Society, (New Haven: Yale University Press,
1999) at 155-77, referring to such a tax as a “privilege tax”.
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scores achieved in high school157 – though these approaches might well raise the
same concerns about “talent slavery” that motivate liberal-egalitarian concerns
about ability or endowment as an ideal tax base. More appealing, perhaps, are tax
rules that would provide graduated cost recovery for investments in education and
training, thereby reducing the tax on returns from these investment, on the basis
that the income derived from the skills and talents acquired through these
investments is more closely related to ambitions and efforts than endowments and
circumstances.158
Dworkin’s opposition to consumption or expenditure as an ideal tax base is
more puzzling given the emphasis that equality of resources places on ex ante
equality, 159 and his conclusion that taxation should not alter the distributive
consequences of individual decisions to take risks or gambles or to save rather than
spend160 – arguments that are often used to support the taxation of personal
consumption or expenditure.161 With respect to risks and gambles, however,
Dworkin acknowledges that “paternalistic” considerations might affect this
conclusion, so that a hypothetical insurance market might compensate persons who
suffer the consequences of bad option luck as well as bad brute luck. 162 Indeed, to
the extent that the gambles involved in most investments entail both known risks
and unknown risks, these gambles are apt to combine elements of option luck and
brute luck, justifying at least some ex post redistribution from winners to losers. For
both reasons, equality of resources might reasonably reject a yield-exemption
consumption tax as incompatible with distributive justice. 163
Zelenak, “Taxing Endowment” supra note 126 at 1180, observing that “if SAT sco res depend on
some combination of social privilege and genetic endowment, a tax based on SAT scores might come
closer to a tax on overall endowment than at tax based on social privilege alone.”
158 See, e.g., David S. Davenport, “Education and Human Capital: Pursui ng an Ideal Income Tax and a
Sensible Tax Policy” (1992), 42 Cas. W. Res. L. Rev. 793.
159 Supra note 102 and accompanying text.
160 Supra notes 97-97 and accompanying text.
161 Supra notes 129-31 and accompanying text.
162 Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue, supra note 20 at 75 and 77. See supra notes 111 and 115 and
accompanying text, suggesti ng that these paternalistic considerations might be integrated with
Dworkin’s idea of equality of resources by imagining what additional insurance individuals in a
hypothetical position of equality might have purchas ed if cognizant of the risks of not insuring
against bad option luck.
163 For a similar argument against a yield-exemption consumption tax, see Graetz, supra note 124 at
1600-01, arguing that “lucky gamblers are not the same as unlucky gamblers” and that “the tax base
must distinguish those who are lucky from those who are unlucky, even though they mi ght hav e been
in the same position with res pect to their expectations before the gamble.” This conclusion assumes
that a tax system can, in fact, apply to returns to risk – which economic analysis demonstrates is not
the cas e in a flat-rate income tax with full loss offsets in which investors can borrow at the risk-free
rate of return in order to increase the size of investments that are subject to taxation in the ev ent of
success and loss offset in the case of failure. See, e.g., Evsey D. Domar and Richard A. Musgrav e,
“Proportional Income Taxation and Risk-Taxing” (1944), 58 Q. J. of Econ. 388; Joseph Bankman and
Thomas Griffith, “Is the Debate Between and Income Tax and a Consumption Tax A Debate About
Risk? Does it Matter? (1992), 47 Tax L. Rev. 377; and David A. Weisbach, “The (Non)Taxation of Risk”
(2004), 58 Tax L. Rev. 1. Since the assumptions on which this conclusion rest are unlikely to apply in
practice, it s eems reasonable to conclude that “reports of the death of principles taxation of risk
157
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Since a cash-flow consumption tax would apply on an ex post basis to all
investment returns that are used for personal consumption, it is not vulnerable to
this objection to the yield-exemption approach.164 By excluding saved income from
tax, however, the effect of a cash-flow consumption tax is to exempt the risk-free
return on invested capital, which is included in the base of an income tax.165
Although consumption-tax advocates often argue that this risk-free return should be
exempt from tax on the basis that it merely compensates savers for deferring their
consumption to a later period,166 others have challenged this theory of the risk-free
rate of return on the grounds that individuals wanting to smooth their consumption
over different taxation periods might reasonably save income for this purpose
without requiring any return167 – suggesting that positive returns on invested
capital are due entirely to the productivity of capital rather than compensation for
deferral.168 As well, if the risk-free return on savings should be exempt because it
compensates for deferred consumption, one might argue that labour income should
also be exempt on the basis that it compensates workers for giving up leisure
time.169
Although Dworkin’s rejection of a personal consumption tax does not
consider these tax policy arguments for or against personal consumption as an ideal
tax base, his assumption that investment returns reflect more than “preferences for
later consumption” is consistent with the tax policy argument that these returns are
attributable to the productivity of capital and are therefore properly included in the
base of a redistributive tax. More generally, his support for income as a tax base and
his view that that the purpose of this tax is to insure against the risk of low market
returns reflect a clear rejection of the argument by some consumption tax advocates
that redistributive taxation should address the resources that one withdraws from
society through personal consumption, rather than the resources that one receives
premium … hav e been greatly exaggerated.” Lawrence Zel enak, “The Sometimes-Taxation of the
Returns to Risk-Bearing Under a Progressive Income Tax” (2006), 59 S.M.U. L. Rev. 879 at 915.
164 See, e.g., Edward J. McCaffery, “A New Understandi ng of Tax” (2005), 103 Mich. L. Rev. 807 at 812,
arguing that a “postpaid” or cash-flow personal consumption taxes are fairer than a “prepai d” or
yield-exemption personal consumption taxes because the former “can and do burden the yield to
capital.”
165 For a numerical demonstration of this result, see Warren, supra note 129 at 1102-1107.
166 See especially Irving Fisher, The Theo ry of Interest as Determined by Impatience to Spend and
Opportuni ty to Invest It, (New York: M acmillan, 1930). For a helpful review of this “supply-side”
account of the origin of interest, see Mark Kelman, “Time Preference and Tax Equity” (1983), 35 Stan.
L. Rev.. 649 at 658-670.
167 See, e.g., Warren, supra note 129 at 1100, suggesting that a rational consumer might reasonably
treat consumption i n each period equally: “Marooned on a desert island with a lifetime store of goods,
a consumer might well allocate an equivalent amount of goods to each of the remaini ng years of his
life.”
168 Ibid. at 1100-1101, sugges ting that “the discount observed ex ante is due entirely to the
productivity of capital, which permits the augmentation of consumption through deferral and
investment.” See also Kelman, supra note 166 at 670-675, reviewing “demand side” accounts of the
origin of interest based on the productivity of capital.
169 Warren, supra note 129 at 1107.
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through labour and investment.170 On the contrary, as one critic of personal
consumption taxation has argued:
There is … a sense in which consumption taxation is less consistent with
individual freedom than is income taxation. The distributive premise of the
consumption tax is that quantitative consumption decisions are for collective,
not individual, judgment. It certainly does not seem obvious that this
premise shows more respect for individual liberty than does the income tax
view that distribution of product is for collective decision. A persons
collective responsibilities are concluded at the time of production under the
income tax; by contrast, under the consumption tax those responsibilities
are not discharged until a person consumes his [or her] last resource.171

For this reason as well, a redistributive tax based on personal income seems more
consistent with equality of resources than a redistributive tax aimed at personal
consumption or expenditure.
In contrast to personal income, on the other hand, liberal-egalitarians
generally oppose wealth as an ideal tax base on the grounds that a personal wealth
tax would impose a tax on income that individuals choose to save rather than
spend.172 Unlike a personal income tax, which applies to the return from saved
income, a personal wealth tax would apply to saved income itself – imposing a
second tax on saved income that would not apply to income that is devoted to
consumption in the same taxation period. For this reason, Dworkin rejects personal
wealth as an ideal base for redistributive taxation, concluding that “[s]omeone’s
decision to spend rather than save … is precisely the kind of decision whose impact
should be determined by the market uncorrected for tax under this analysis.” 173
Crucially, however, this conclusion depends on the assumption that income is
subject to redistributive taxation before it is saved or spent, and that inheritances
are also subject to a system of just redistribution, so that personal wealth is justly
held.174 To the extent that neither assumption holds, which might be true of an
income tax that generally does not apply to unrealized gains, equality of resources
might contemplate a role for personal wealth taxation as a supplement to an income
tax or a tax on the transfer of wealth. Equality of resources might also contemplate a
role for personal wealth taxation to reduce extreme concentrations of wealth, on the
basis that equally-situated individuals participating in a hypothetical insurance
market might reasonably have insured against a society of extreme inequalities in
which they might suffer the “distinct harm of occupying a low tier in the class
Supra note 131 and accompanying text.
Warren, supra note 129 at 1120-21.
172 See, e.g., Rakowski, supra note 149.
173 Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue, supra note 20 at 479, n. 8.
174 These assumptions are implicit in Dworkin’s view that equality of resources requi res that
individuals be situated equally ex ante. Although Dworkin notes that he does not consider “the
problem of later generations” and the role of inheri tance or es tate taxes in his analysis of the
personal tax base, he addresses this issue separately. Ibid.
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system.” 175 In principle, however, Dworkin and other liberal-egalitarians appear to
regard well-designed income and inheritance taxes as sufficient for this purpose.
Finally, it is useful to reiterate two important aspects of Dworkin’s proposal
for a redistributive income tax: that it should be levied at progressive rates, and that
revenues should be devoted exclusively to benefits paid to those whose skills and
talents command low market returns. Although Dworkin’s rationale for progressive
rates relies on a principle of diminishing marginal utility of income, which equallysituated individuals are assumed to take into account in a hypothetical insurance
market, 176 equality of resources might also favour progressivity on the basis that
higher market returns are more likely to reflect an element of brute luck than
ordinary returns – a presumption that is consistent with the phenomenon of
“winner-take-all” markets in which certain positions offer returns that greatly
exceed those available to marginally less successful competitors.177 It might also
contemplate higher rates on speculative gains that are also apt to reflect a
significant element of brute luck (combined with option luck).
As for the idea that income tax revenues should be devoted exclusively to
redistributive transfers, this approach would contradict both traditional public
finance theory which rejects the idea of dedicated taxes, and prevailing practice in
most developed countries which adds revenues from income taxes to general tax
revenues. It might also suggest a more limited role for progressive income taxation
as part of a tax system in which governments rely more extensively on other taxes
including sales taxes and benefit-related taxes in order to finance public goods and
services. 178 At the same time, however, dedicating income tax revenues to
redistributive transfer programs might provide a more compelling rationale for
progressive income taxation than welfarist rationales based on ability to pay which
do not adequately account for individual entitlements.

Ibid. at 348, in the context of taxes on estates or inheritances. A personal wealth tax along these
lines might be consistent with the view that an egalitarian society should place constraints on the
extent to which markets are allowed to produce extreme inequalities. See, e.g., Anderson, supra note
122.
176 Ibid. at 100-101. Although D workin’s reliance on this principle mi ght s eem to suggest that his
justification for progressive tax rates is ultimately based on individual welfare or utility, Dworkin
emphasizes that the “the point of the strategy is fai rness to individuals” who are presumed i n this
respect to take into account the impact of different income levels on their welfare. Ibid. at 349-50.
177 See, e. g., Robert H. Frank and Philip J. Cook, The Winner-Take-All Society, (New York: Penguin
Books, 1995). For an application of the theory to progressive taxation, see M artin J. McMahon, Jr. and
Alice G. Abreu, “Winner-Take-All Markets: Easing the Cas e for Progressive Taxation” (1998), 4 Fla.
Tax Rev. 1.
178 See, e.g., Michael J. Graetz, 100 Million Unnecessary Returns : A simple, Fair and Competitive Plan for
the United States, (New Hav en: Yale University Press, 2008), recommending a reduced role for the
income tax as an explicitly redistributive tax alongside a broad-based sales or value-added tax; and
David G. Duff, “Benefi t Taxes and Us er Fees in Theory and Practice” (2004), 54 U.T.L.J. 391,
supporting benefit taxes and user fees as an element of a tax system that includes redistributive taxes.
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B. Inheritance Taxation
In addition to a progressive income tax, Dworkin argues that equality of
resources would also favour “an inheritance tax, at a steeply progressive rate.” 179
Although fiercely opposed by some commentators on the welfarist grounds that
taxes on the transfer of wealth allegedly discourage capital accumulation and
impede economic growth,180 and the non-welfarist basis that these taxes constitute
a “double tax” on hard-working and thrifty donors who managed to accumulate
wealth during their lifetimes, 181 these taxes are widely supported by liberalegalitarians on the grounds that substantial transfers of wealth from one generation
to another are essentially unearned by their recipients, undermine ideals of fair
equality of opportunity, and perpetuate dynastic concentrations of wealth that
undermine social, economic and political equality. 182 According to Rawls, for
example, progressive gift and inheritance taxes are necessary “not to raise revenue
… but gradually and continually to correct the distribution of wealth and to prevent
concentrations of power detrimental to the fair value of political liberty and fair
equality of opportunity.”183 Dworkin’s argument for a progressive inheritance tax is
broadly consistent with these concerns, though his emphasis on ethical
individualism as a principle of distributive justice dictates that his account turns on
considerations of individual right rather than collective good.
For Dworkin, the argument for inheritance taxation requires a reconciliation
between two “competing demands” of equality of resources: (1) that individuals are
generally free “to spend what is rightfully theirs” after tax as they choose – “on
expensive cars or art or travel, for example” – without restriction through “further
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taxes”;184 and (2) that “it is unjust when some people lead their lives with less
wealth available to them, or in otherwise less favorable circumstances, than others,
not through some choice or gamble of their own but through brute bad luck.”185
Taking both principles into account, Dworkin rejects the idea that gifts and bequests
should be prohibited altogether,186 but concludes that “people may be taxed on what
they give or leave to others because this … form of expenditure … produces injustice
in the next generation.” 187
In order to fully justify and specify the form of this tax, Dworkin resorts to
the same device that he employs to justify a progressive income tax, imagining
“another hypothetical insurance market in which hypothetical people may all buy
insurance on equal terms.” 188 According to Dworkin:
Inheritance insurance would make sense … to guarantee … against the … harm
of occupying a low tier in a class system – against, that is, a life in a community
where others have much more money, and consequently more status and
power, than they do and their children will.189

On this basis, he maintains, equally-situated individuals would insure against “bad
inheritance luck” – accepting a structure of premiums that would “rise … steeply
from zero in the case of modest gifts or a modest estate to a very high marginal
proportion of very great wealth.” 190 In addition, he suggests, since “it falls to income
taxes” to finance medical benefits and redistributive transfers to individuals whose
Dworkin, Sovereign Vi rtue Revisited” supra note 63 at 125; and Dworki n, Sovereign Virtue, supra
note 20 at 347. Although Dworkin is not clear on this point, the general prohibi tion agains t “further
taxes” that he contemplates presumably would not exclude broad -bas ed sal es or value-added taxes
or more targeted benefit taxes or user fees that finance public goods and services, nor regulatory
taxes such as environmental taxes that are deliberately designed to discourage behaviour that
imposed negative externalities on others. In contras t, equality of resources would appear to exclude
luxury taxes that might be designed to discourage “conspicuous consumption”.
185 Ibid.
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an essential element of his theory, some critics have argued that equality of resources demands
“extremely strict regulation of gifts and bequests … to ensure that nobody benefits to a greater
degree from such gifts and bequests than anyone else.” See, e.g., Otsuka, supra note 122 at 52.
Dworkin’s respons e seeks a balance between two demands of equality, taki ng into account the
position of those who wish to transfer wealth to others gratuitously, as well as the position of those
in subsequent generations whose opportuniti es and social position are affected by thes e transfers.
For a more detailed effort to balance these competing demands in the design of an inheri tance tax,
see Duff, “Taxing Inherited Wealth” supra note 182.
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188 Ibid. For a critical assessment of D workin’s reliance on a hypothetical insurance market for
inheritance, see Dani el Halliday, “Inheri tance and Hy pothetical Insurance” in S. Sciaraffa and w.
Waluchow, eds., The Legacy of Ronald Dworkin, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016) 99-114,
arguing that Dworki n’s commitment to an inheritance tax may also be supported by a commitment to
independence that justifies a cons traint on unrestricted inheritance to prevent class stratification
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skills and talents command low market returns, inheritance tax revenues should be
used “for improved public education, education and training loans for would -be
professionals, and other programs that ease the impact of whatever economic
stratification remains after the tax has been levied.”191
While Dworkin contemplates that these premiums would be paid by donors,
in the form of a gift and estate tax that is “measured by the assets given or
bequeathed,”192 liberal-egalitarians generally favour donee-based taxes that are
measured by the assets that individuals receive by way of gift or inheritance.193
Since a donee-based tax would apply tax-exempt thresholds and progressive rates
to the value of assets received by beneficiaries rather than the value of assets
accumulated by donors, it is more finely attuned to concerns about unequal
inheritance than a donor-based tax – imposing the largest tax obligations on the
most fortunate beneficiaries who receive the largest gifts and inheritances,
encouraging donors to distribute their wealth more widely, and thereby reducing
the impact of gifts and inheritances on unequal opportunities and the dynastic
concentration of wealth.194 For these reasons, a donee-based gift and inheritance
tax should also be easier to justify as a tax on the fortunate beneficiaries of
substantial gifts and inheritances, rather than a tax on hard-working and thrifty
donors, and less vulnerable to the criticism that it constitutes double taxation of
accumulated wealth on which tax has already been paid. 195
Although Dworkin does not consider these arguments for a donee-based tax
on the intergenerational transfer of wealth, his justification for a progressive
inheritance tax is arguably more compatible with gift and inheritance tax levied on
donees than it is with a gift and estate tax levied on donors – since it seems most
reasonable to assume that hypothetical individuals would pay for insurance against
the risk of “bad inheritance luck” with premiums corresponding to the
manifestation of “good inheritance luck.” Indeed, in a subsequent comment on his
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inheritance tax proposal, Dworkin appears to accept that this tax should “fall not on
the donor, … but on the recipient of the gift or bequest.” 196
Finally, Dworkin’s argument that inheritance tax revenues should be devoted
to public education and other programs designed to reduce economic stratification
seems reasonable given that a central purpose of these taxes to reduce unequal
opportunities – though one might also imagine other uses such as the payment of a
“social inheritance” to individuals reaching the age of maturity, 197 and is important
to recognize that additional resources should also be devoted to public education
and other programs to support advanced education and training on the grounds that
these programs constitute public services that confer societal benefits in addition to
those enjoyed by individual recipients. As with Dworkin’s argument for the
dedication of income tax revenues to redistributive transfers, this approach to the
use of inheritance tax revenues would contradict traditional public finance theory
and prevailing practice in most developed countries that levy taxes on transfers of
wealth, 198 but could help to enhance public understanding and support for
inheritance taxation as an essential element of a just tax system.
IV. Conclusion
While this article does not endorse all aspects of Dworkin’s theory, it argues
that equality of resources provides a more compelling account of distributive justice
than welfare-based theories, Rawlsian theory and classical libertarianism –
combining a conception of economic equality with principles of individual freedom
and responsibility in a way that affords better recognition to both sets of values than
these other approaches. On this basis, it examines Dworkin’s arguments for
redistributive taxation, building on his brief remarks to defend progressive income
and inheritance taxes for this purpose.
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To the extent that justice is the first virtue of social institutions, it follows
that a just society should attend to the distributive justice of its tax system as its first
or sovereign virtue. Relying on Dworkin’s conception of equality of resources as a
guide, a just tax system would include progressive income and inheritances taxes.
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